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Roodman: Roodman: Business Owners Duty

BUSINESS OWNERS DUTY TO
PROTECT INVITEES FROM THIRD
PARTY CRIMINAL ATTACKS -OR"BUSINESS OWNERS BEWARE:
MISSOURI UPS THE ANTE"
Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc.'

INTRODUCTION

On December 15, 1984, Opel Madden parked her car in the parking
lot of C & K Barbecue in St. Louis, Missouri. As she returned to her car
after purchasing food in the restaurant, a male stranger asked her for help
in jump starting his car. 2 The stranger then brandished a gun, forced his
way into Opel's car and kidnapped her.3 He subsequently physically and
4
sexually assaulted her.
In a similar but more dramatic case, on December 14, 1982, Gary and
Donna Decker went shopping at a plaza 5 in North St. Louis County,
Missouri. Two unknown assailants forcibly abducted both Gary and Donna
as they returned to their car. 6 The assailants raped and sodomized Donna7
before leaving the two dead in a vacant lot in East St. Louis, Illinois.'
In both Madden v. C. & K. Carryout, Inc. and Decker v. Gramex
Corp., the plaintiffs brought actions in negligence against the business
owners. They alleged that the business owners were negligent in failing to

1. Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1988)

(en banc). Two cases, Madden v. C & K Barbeque Carryout, Inc. and Decker v.
Gramex Corp. were consolidated for purpose of appeal.

2. Id. at 60.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The plaza consisted of a grocery store and a discount department store.
Id. at 60-61.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. East St. Louis, Illinois is a city located across the Mississippi river
from St. Louis, Missouri.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

1

Missouri
Law Review,
Vol. 54,REVIEW
Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 8
MISSOURI
LAW

[Vol. 54

provide adequate security, and for failing to warn invitees 9 of the potential
danger on the business premises. 0 In both Madden and Decker, the plaintiffs
alleged that the frequent criminal activity on the premises during the
preceding three years gave the defendants sufficient notice of the potential
danger of criminal attacks." The trial courts in both cases dismissed the
actions. 12 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court consolidated the two
cases, reversed both lower courts, and held that "business owners may be

under a duty to protect their invitees from the criminal attacks of unknown
third persons .... 13 The court held that if the plaintiffs establish prior
crimes on the business premises, such crimes would be "sufficient to put
the defendant on notice to the possibility that his invitees may be exposed
to danger from the criminal attack of unknown third persons .... -14 The
court remanded the case to the lower court for a jury determination on
whether the defendants satisfied their respective duties of care."
While claims against business owners for injuries resulting from unknown third party criminal attacks upon business premises are rapidly
becoming common and viable in tort, the standards to impose a duty upon
business owners to aid potential victims or to provide safe premises are
quite dissimilar from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 6 This Note will review
the various recognized theories of recovery, emphasizing the application
and effect of the prior violent crimes exception 7 in imposing a duty upon
business owners.
NEGLIGENCE AND DuTY
As in Madden and Decker, invitees usually seek recovery from business
owners under a negligence theory 8 for injuries resulting from criminal

9. This Note will use the terms "invitee" and "business invitee" throughout
the text to refer to an individual who has been "invited to enter or remain on
land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor of the land." See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 332(3) (1965).
10. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 60-61.
11. Id. In the three years preceding the criminal attack in Madden, the
plaintiff alleged that there were six armed robberies, six strong arm robberies, one
assault, and one purse snatching. In Decker, the plaintiff alleged the occurrence
of four armed robberies, three purse snatchings, forty-five assorted thefts, one

robbery in the second degree, one attempted armed robbery, one assault, and one
assault with a deadly weapon. Id.
12. In Madden the case was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, and in Decker upon motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 60.
13. Id. at 62.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 63.
16. This Note will discuss the various standards used in respective jurisdictions
throughout the text.
17. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
18. Business invitees who have been subjected to a criminal attack have a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/8

2

1989]

Roodman: Roodman:
Business Owners Duty
BUSINESS
INVITEES

attacks which occur upon a business owner's premises. To seek damages
for negligence, according to Faheen v. City Parking Corp., a "plaintiff
must allege ultimate facts which, if proven, show (1) the existence of a
duty on the part of [the] defendant to protect [the] plaintiff from injury,
(2) failure of [the] defendant to perform that duty, and (3) injury to the

plaintiff resulting from such failure."' 19 Proving the existence of a duty is
initially the most important threshold a plaintiff must overcome."0
The basic premise that supports a business owner's duty to protect
invitees from criminal attacks rests upon the business owner's presumed
control. 2' Such control includes control over some third parties, the business
premises, as well as the ability to "restrain or expel" dangerous individuals
from the premises where a crime could have been anticipated and guarded
against.32 The majority of jurisdictions, as well as the Restatement of
Torts,23 have recognized that if certain conditions are present 24 business
owners have a duty to protect invitees from third party criminal attacks.
While there is generally no duty upon a business owner to protect an

very limited selection of potential defendants should they choose to seek recovery
for injuries they may have incurred. The primary potential defendants include the
criminal attacker and the business owner. In order to recover from the attacker
the individual must first be identified and apprehended. In addition, the criminal
may not have sufficient assets to compensate the plaintiff. Therefore, business
owners are a much more attractive defendant due to the likelihood of sufficient
insurance coverage, as well as assets to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. If the business
owner contracted with a third party to provide security, the third party may also
be a potential defendant.
19. Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) (citing Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 720
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965).
20. The determination as to whether duty exists is a preliminary question
to be determined by the court. See R.STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 328B (1965).
Therefore, the plaintiff must first establish that a duty exists in order to present
a case to a jury.
21. See Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Meadows, 655 S.W.2d at 721.
22. Nappier, 666 S.W.2d at 861.
23. RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965) provides:
Business Premises Open to Public: Acts of Third Persons or Animals
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his
business purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they
are upon the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the
accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals,
and by the failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or
otherwise to protect them against it.
24. This Note will examine the conditions which are necessary to impose a
duty with respect to recognized exceptions throughout the text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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invitee from such attacks, 21 courts have imposed a duty under two excep27 are present,28 or 2)
tions:26 1) where "special facts and circumstances"
29
where a "special relationship" exists.
TrE SPEcIAL FACTS AND CIRcUMSTANCES EXCEPTION
This Note will focus primarily on the "special facts and circumstances"
exception. Jurisdictions that recognize it give the exception a variety of
standards. 30 These standards and definitions contain some inherent ambiguities.
The special facts exception "requires some relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant which encourages the plaintiff to come upon
the defendant's premises."'" This condition will almost always be met where
a business-invitee relationship exists. 32 Within this requirement, two situa-33
tions support a court's use of the special facts and circumstances exception
in placing a duty upon a business owner: "(1) an intentional infliction of
injury by known and identifiable third persons; or (2) frequent and recent
occurrences of violent crimes against persons on the premises by unknown
34
assailants."

25. See Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 59 (citing Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage
Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Faheen v. City
Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
26. These two exceptions are recognized by the Restatement. RESTATEMNT
(SEcOND) OF TORTS § 302B comment e (1965).

27. The phrases "special facts," "special circumstances," and "special facts
and circumstances" will be used interchangeably throughout the text.
28. Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 272; RESTATMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 302B
comment e (1965).
29. The "special relationship" exception is widely accepted and relatively
simple to recognize and apply. See Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 272. Special relationships
evolve from situations where an individual has either explicitly or implicitly relied
upon another for his protection or safety. Commonly recognized relationships found
to impose such a duty have been those of innkeeper and guest, common carrier
and passenger, school and student, occasionally employer and employee, and in
certain circumstances, landlord and tenant. Missouri courts have long recognized
these relationships to impose a duty of care. See Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 272; see
also Meadows, 655 S.W.2d at 721; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B comment
e, illustration B (1965).
30. The specific exceptions and the variations which are recognized by different jurisdictions will be discussed in the following text.
31. Faheen, 734 S.W.2d 270, 272.
32. Inducement or encouragement is a relatively easy element to satisfy in
a business-invitee relationship and is virtually always satisfied. Inducement may be
as simple as a product or service advertisement, a sign in front of a business, a
television advertisement, or even telephone solicitation.
33. See infra note 38.
34. Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 272 (citing Irby v. St. Louis Cab Co., 560 S.W.2d
392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/8
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The first "special facts" classification includes circumstances where "a
known dangerous or violent individual is present, or where an individual
present has conducted himself so as to indicate danger and sufficient time
exists to prevent injury." ' 35 In this situation, the business owner faces an
exigent circumstance which gives rise to a duty to take some affirmative
action where he has sufficient time and opportunity to do so. 36 Therefore,
the key elements to invoke duty within the classification are the present
knowledge of the danger and the ability to take some remedial measure
37
to protect the potential victim.

The second "special facts" classification, 38 "prior violent crimes," is
comprised of numerous public policy and fairness considerations. Although
all jurisdictions do not follow the exception, 39 it is quickly gaining acceptance
and critical appeal. 40 Prior to Faheen and Madden, Missouri courts were
inconsistent in their treatment of the prior violent acts exception. 4 ' The
Missouri court of appeals in Faheen recognized the viability of the prior
violent crime theory,4 2 and the Missouri Supreme Court's Madden decision

35. Meadows v Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 721
(Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1976) (en
banc)); accord Pizzurro v. First North County Bank & Trust Co., 545 S.W.2d 348
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
36. See Meadows, 655 S.W.2d at 721.
37. See id.
38. The second "special facts" exception is commonly referred to as the
"prior violent crimes" or "prior violent acts" exception. These terms will be used
interchangeably throughout the text. See Vorbeck v. Carnegie's at Soulard, Inc.,
704 S.W.2d 296 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
39. Many courts not utilizing foreseeability as the standard for duty where
a criminal act has occurred will not hold a business owner liable merely because
prior violent acts have taken place on the premises. See, e.g., Gillot v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp. 454 (D.C. 1981) (rape occurred in parking
lot); Cook v. Safeway.Stores, Inc., 354 A.2d 507 (D.C. 1974) (shopper assaulted
while trying to recover her purse after it was snatched); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528
S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (assault occurred on shopping center parking lot); Castillo
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 663 S.W.2d 60 (Texas Ct. App. 1983) (assault on mall
parking lot).
40. The extension of liability adopted by the Missouri Supreme Court in
Madden is representative of the growing trend to impose this liability upon business
owners. See Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, -, 445 A.2d 1141,
1144 (1982) ("The historical classifications of the degree of care owing to visitors
upon land are undergoing gradual change in the favor of a broadening application
of a general tort obligation to exercise reasonable care against foreseeable harm
to others.").
41. See infra note 42.
42. Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 273. Faheen appears to be the first time a
Missouri court articulated the adoption of the "prior violent crimes" theory as a
viable method to invoke duty. See Warren v. Lombardo's Enter., Inc., 706 S.W.2d
286, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (it has not been decided whether prior criminal acts
on the premises constituted "special facts" sufficient to invoke an exception to
the general rule of no duty). But see Brown v. National Supermarkets, Inc., 679
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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affirms the viability of the prior violent acts exception. 43 This recognition
and acceptance of the prior violent acts exception brings Missouri into the
growing trend of broadening the scope of a business owner's duty.
POLICY CONSIDERATONS

Courts have examined a number of pertinent policy considerations to
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the prior violent acts exception.
These considerations include a variety of public policy concerns including
fairness, public interest, and economic consequences." "It is the court's
'expression of the sum total of [these] considerations of policy which lead
the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."' 45
Fairness
Courts adopting the prior violent crimes exception have not been
consistent in defining the scope of the duty and degree of care a business
owner must follow to avoid liability. Most decisions rely upon one of two
different principles to determine the standard of care. 46 Historically, most
courts held that the determination of such duty "depends ultimately on
the question of fairness, which in turn is decided by a weighing of the
relationship involved, 47 the nature of the risk, and the public interest 48 in

the proposed solution." ' 49 The question of fairness appears to hinge upon
the business owners ability "to ascertain in advance of a jury's verdict

S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (actual or constructive notice of prior violent
acts upon the business premises may invoke the duty of reasonable care upon the
business owner).
43. See Pickle v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., No. W.D.-40480 (Mo. Ct. App.,
Dec. 20, 1988) (WESTLAW Mo. Database).
44. See Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962).
45. Vandermost v. Alpha Beta Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 771, 776, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 613, 615 (1985) (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 325-26 (4th ed. 1971)).
46.

These two principles are "fairness and public policy" and "foreseea-

bility." This Note will discuss each of these principles in the following text. See
infra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.

47. The nature of the relationship may invoke duty through the "special
relationship" exception to liability, or a business-invitee relationship will satisfy
one element of the "special facts and circumstances" exception. See Faheen, 734
S.W.2d at 272. See also supra note 37.
48. Public interest may be characterized in a number of ways. It may be
the interest in leaving police action to the state or possibly choosing the best
economic alternative. It should also be noted that economic alternatives may also
be characterized in different manners.
49. Meadows, 655 S.W.2d at 721 (citing Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38
N.J. 578,
-, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/8
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whether the duty is his and whether he has performed it."' ° The element
of fairness considers whether the law provides business owners with sufficient
specific notice to ascertain the degree of safety required to avert liability.-'
The recent Missouri opinion in Madden bypasses the standard of fairness,
2
and instead approves the use of foreseeability as a standard.
Foreseeability
Third party criminal acts are inherently uncertain for a business owner.

While it is generally recognized that crime is foreseeable in today's society,53
using criminal activity as an indicator of whether future crimes are foreseeable, or whether particular safety measures are adequate, is fraught with
numerous uncertainties.5 4 Factors such as whether safety measures actually

deter crime, or whether a business owner's lack of safety measures is
sufficient to prove causation, present courts and juries with "extraordinary
speculation." 5
FREQUENCY AND SIMILARITY

Where prior crimes have occurred on a business owner's premises, an
important question becomes the frequency and type of crime necessary to
impose a duty upon the business owner to protect invitees from future
criminal acts. If business owners are to be obliged to protect invitees from
criminal attacks, they should be able to determine the degree, type of prior
crimes that will give rise to such a duty as well as the measure of care
56
requisite to avoid liability.
In Faheen v. City Parking Garage5 7 the plaintiff brought an action
for the wrongful death of her father who died in a car bombing in the

50. Goldberg, 38 N.J. at -, 186 A.2d at 297 (case involved an action
by a milk delivery man who was beaten and robbed in a self-service elevator in
a building).
51. See id.
52. See Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62 ("The touchstone for the creation of a
duty is foreseeability.").
53. Meadows, 655 S.W.2d at 721.
54. Goldberg, 38 N.J. at -, 186 A.2d at 297.
55. See id. at -,
186 A.2d at 297 ("It would be quite a guessing game
to determine whether some unknown thug of unknowable character and mentality
would have been deterred if the owner had furnished some or some additional
policeman."). See also Tipton, Business Insecurity; "Negligent Security" Suits Rise,
St. Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1988, at 35BP ("Some business owners and
lawyers say many negligence cases are unfair because no existing security system,
no matter how elaborate, could stop a determined criminal."); cf. Galloway v.
Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 1988) (court used foreseeability
but stated that "even shoplifting cases can turn ugly").
56. See Goldberg, 38 N.J. at -, 186 A.2d at 297.
57. 734 S.W.2d 270 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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She alleged that during the five years before

the fatality there had been numerous incidents of crime reasonably sufficient
to give the defendant notice of the need for reasonable precautions to
protect tenants.5 9 The court held that a specific element of the prior violent
crimes exception requires that "the incident causing the injury must be
sufficiently similar in type to the prior specific incidents occurring on the
premises." 6 The appellate court accordingly held that the case was properly
dismissed for lack of sufficient similarity and frequency of crimes. 6 '
The standard which the Faheen court articulated is inherently ambiguous. There still exists a question as to how similar or frequent a crime

must be before a business owner has a duty to protect invitees under the
prior violent crimes exception. In Madden, while the court appeared to
affirm the "sufficient similarity" standard set out in Faheen, it established
a broader standard.6 2 The court attached "reasonable foreseeability" to
the prior violent crime exception, thereby allowing a case to go to a jury
if the invitee's injury could have been reasonably foreseen in the context
of the prior violent crimes committed.63 Although this standard is not
uncommon, 64 it unfortunately does not give business owners any specific

guidance or predictability in determining when a duty or potential liability
will be triggered.65 Rather, the standard leaves the question to the trier of
6
fact .

58. Id. at 271.
59. Id. at 271-72 (prior incidents of crime on the premises and within close
proximity included arson, robbery, assault, burglary, stealing, and various misdemeanors).
60. Id. at 274.
61. Id. ("Most important to our decision are the types of crimes reported.").
62. See Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62-63. The court distinguished the lack of
similarity of prior crimes in Faheen, from those in Madden and Decker, by finding
that "[a]n assassination by car bombing may not be reasonably foreseeable to a
business owner based on prior incidents of violent street crime, but abduction,
sexual assault, and even murder committed by use of a firearm should be foreseeable
based on such street crimes." Id. at 62 n.2.
63. Id.at 62.
64. See, e.g., Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1984); Cohen
v. Southland Corp., 157 Cal. App. 3d 130, 203 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1984); Taco Bell,
Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987); Antrum v. Church's Fried Chicken,
Inc., 40 Conn. Supp. 343, 499 A.2d 807 (1985); Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d

518 (Del. 1987); Stevens v. Jefferson, 436 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1983); Levitz v. Burger
King Corp., 526 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Galloway v. Bankers
Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988); Martinko v. H-N-W Assocs., 393 N.W.2d
320 (Iowa 1986); Taylor v. Hocker, 101 Inl. App. 3d 639, 428 N.E.2d 662 (1981);
Harris v. Pizza Hut, 455 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1984); Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc.,
89 N.J. 270, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982).
65. See Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 52-53 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (the use of
foreseeability provides a business owner with no guidance or standard on which
to base his performance).
66. Jurisdictions utilizing the foreseeability standard have not generated a
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/8
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Many courts which have evaluated the application of the "reasonably
foreseeable" standard to the occurrence of crimes have stated that the
occurrence of crime is always foreseeable. 67 The difficulty associated with
the predictability of crime is why some courts still utilize "fairness and
public policy" to determine the existence of duty, rather than foreseeability.1
The use of a foreseeability standard to determine if a present criminal act
could have been anticipated by reviewing prior criminal acts on a business
premise could easily lead to unfair liability. A simple purse snatching
illustrates the problem. If a purse snatching occurs in a parking lot, it is
reasonably foreseeable that a woman may be physically harmed in a similar
attempt in the future. If the woman resists or can identify the assailant,
it is reasonably foreseeable that the assailant may injure, silence, or even
abduct the woman. If the assailant abducts or injures the woman, it is
reasonably foreseeable that he may eventually rape or even murder her.
The attenuated circumstance in this example simply shows that a business
owner may anticipate almost any severity or type of crime from simple
criminal conduct. 6 9 Some jurisdictions using the standard of foreseeability
have held that prior nonviolent criminal acts may substantiate a finding

solution to provide business owners with predictable liability. See, e.g., Antrum v.
Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 40 Conn. Super. 343, 499 A.2d 807 (1985) (court
submitted the question of foreseeability to the jury to determine whether the business
owner should have realized the potential danger); see also Levitz v. Burger King
Corp., 526 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (plaintiff was beaten up in the
parking lot of the defendant's restaurant and the court found that there were
sufficient prior similar acts to allow the issue of "reasonable foreseeability" to go
to the jury). But see Castillo v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 663 S.W.2d 60 (Texas Ct.
App. 1983) (while plaintiffs were shopping in a mall they met some other men
and went with them to the parking lot where they were physically assaulted. The
court found no duty upon the business owner.).
67. See Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718,
721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) ("crime . .. is regrettably foreseeable in today's society
any place, any time"); see also Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186
A.2d 291, 293 (1962) ("Everyone can foresee the commission of crime virtually
anywhere and at any time.").
68. See, e.g., Castillo v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 663 S.W.2d 60, 66 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983) ("it would be patently unfair to impose the vague duty of section
344, Restatement of Torts (Second) (1966) on the shol3keepers and merchants of
Texas to exercise reasonable care to discover the sudden criminal acts of unknown
and unidentifiable persons are being done or likely to be done"); see also Gillot
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1981); Henley
v. Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1984); Davis v. Allied Supermarkets,
Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976); Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews, Inc., 269
S.C. 479, 238 S.E.2d 167 (1977); Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.
1975).

69. Cf. Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 1988)
(discusses the relationship between several simple crimes and the ability for such
crimes to escalate into serious or violent crimes, although the court uses the theory
of foreseeability; "even shoplifting cases can turn ugly").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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that a future violent crime was foreseeable. 70 Such dangers suggest analysis
7
utilizing the doctrines of proximate, intervening, and superseding cause. 1
Courts which refuse to adopt the foreseeability standard for the prior
violent acts exception frequently rely upon the criminal act constituting a
superseding cause due to the "difficult problem of determining foreseeability
of criminal acts." 72
Another difficult situation exists when a business is located in an area
where the incidence of crime is high. A number of courts have addressed
this issue.73 Courts relying upon the principle of "fairness" typically have
found the sole element of being in an area of high crime insufficient to
invoke the prior violent crimes exception. 74 But jurisdictions utilizing foreseeability will typically submit the question to the jury. 7" If an individual
business has not experienced any crime, should it be subject to the same
standard of liability as businesses in the same area which have experienced

70. See id. at 440.
71. See Nappier v. Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(citing Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188, 195 (Tenn. 1975)).
72. Gillot v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 507 F. Supp. 454
(D.D.C. 1981); Davis v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 547 P.2d 963 (Okla. 1976);
Cornpropst, 528 S.W.2d at 195.
73. See, e.g., Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987) ("fact that crimes in general have occurred in an area or that a business
is located in a 'high crime' area is insufficient to invoke the duty") (assassination
in apartment house parking garage); see also Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214
(5th Cir. 1984) (hotel patron shot outside hotel on sidewalk); Harris v. Pizza Hut,
455 So. 2d 1364 (La. 1984) (restaurant located in an area of high crime, robbery
was reasonably foreseeable, more than a case of mere possibility); Nappier v.
Kincade, 666 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (wrongful death action for fatal
injury from an assault in an all night fast food restaurant parking lot); Meadows
v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (woman
assaulted and shot while on premises); Irby v. St. Louis County Cab Co., 560
S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (wrongful death action where deceased cab driver
dispatched to "high crime area"); Compropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.
1975) (woman assaulted on shopping parking lot). But see Madden v. C & K
Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (question of business
owner's liability for attack on invitee should go to the jury).
74. See Faheen, 734 S.W.2d at 27 ("fact that crimes in general have occurred
in an area or that a business is located in a 'high crime' area is insufficient to
invoke the duty;" assassination in apartment house parking garage); see also Irby
v. St. Louis County Cab Co., 560 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (wrongful
death action where deceased cab driver dispatched to "high crime area"); Cornpropst
v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn. 1975) (woman assaulted on shop parking lot).
75. See Pickle v. Denny's Restaurant, Inc., No. WD-40480 (Mo. Ct. App.,
Dec 20, 1988) (WESTLAW Mo. Database) ("whether the defendant satisfied that
duty is a jury question"); see also Harris v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 455 So. 2d 1364
(La. 1984) (court held that an area of high crime presented reasonable foreseeability
that a robbery would occur). But see Henley v. Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So. 2d 272
(Ala. 1984); Uihlein v. Albertson's Inc., 282 Or. 631, 580 P.2d 1014 (1978).
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crime? In jurisdictions adopting the standard of foreseeability, the jury
will decide these questions.
Madden, and other jurisdictions using the foreseeability standard leave
unanswered the question as to what degree of care will exculpate a business
owner from liability. The court in Nappier v. Kincade 6 stated that "reasonable measures must be taken to control the conduct of third persons,
or to give adequate warning to enable patrons to avoid possible harm." 77
The Restatement addresses the question of whether a mere warning indicating an area of high crime will satisfy a business owner's duty. 78 In
jurisdictions adopting the Restatement view the answer would be no.7 9 The

Restatement recognizes that warnings may sometimes be sufficient, but a
business owner must take reasonable means to protect invitees if a warning
is not reasonably likely to work. 0 The actual degree of care necessary to
avoid liability appears to be left to the trier of fact in jurisdictions adopting
foreseeability in conjunction with the prior violent crimes exception.
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

There are persuasive economic arguments to support, as well as to
reject, the recognition of a prior violent acts exception. The economic
consequences of such liability appear quite different depending upon how
the affected class is characterized. If viewed in the broadest economic sense,
one may argue that the imposition of liability upon the business owner
will benefit society. 8 This view is premised upon the belief that the increased
cost of imposing liability will be spread out among consumers.8 2 The
imposition of tort liability for third party criminal acts upon a business
owner is an indirect method of transferring the costs and damages which

76. 666 S.W.2d 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
77. Id. at 862.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 344 (1965).
79. Id.
80. See id. § 344 comment d (1965) which provides:
In many cases a warning is sufficient care if the possessor reasonably
believes that it will be enough to enable the visitor to avoid the harm,
or protect himself against it. There are, however, many situations in which
the possessor cannot reasonably assume that a warning will be sufficient.
He is then is required to exercise reasonable care to use such means of
protection as are available, or to provide such means in advance because
of the likelihood that third persons, or animals, may conduct themselves
in a manner which will endanger the safety of the visitor.
81. See, e.g., Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1987) (plaintiff
sustained injury when shot attempting to exit a Taco Bell after becoming aware
a robbery was in progress).
82. See id. at 49 (court expressed an opinion that minimum increases in the
cost of services or products would offset the expense incurred by business owners).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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an individual victim incurs to the public.83 A business owner, with a duty
under the prior violent crimes exception, will likely experience increased
costs through higher insurance premiums, safety programs, additional
em84
ployees, safety hardware, and expenses related to liability claims.
Proponents of the prior violent acts exception contend that without
such a duty business owners who encounter criminal conduct will eventually
experience diminished sales due to the customer's fear of crime associated
with a lack of adequate security.85 It follows that business owners would
have to increase prices to make up for the decreased revenues, resulting
in the cost of the crime being transferred to the consumer anyway.8 6 The
argument continues that the end result, without imposing liability upon
the business owner, has the same economic repercussion without deterring
crime.87 Thus, the cost to society could be virtually the same if the prior
violent crime exception were imposed, but society could potentially enjoy
the benefits of fewer crimes, safer environments, increased business, and
potentially decreased insurance costs.88 Of course, this entire argument is
based upon the assumption that increased safety measures due to the
imposition of liability will deter crime.
The flip-side to this argument is most persuasive when the economic
effect is characterized by the effect on the individual businesses. As stated
previously, the cost of doing business will increase due to the cost of safety
programs, additional employees, safety hardware, liability claims, and higher
insurance premiums.8 9
83.

Warren v. Lombardo's Enter. Inc., 706 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo. Ct. App.

1986).
84. The business owner's actual costs will vary depending upon the individual
circumstances. Some courts express the view that a number of safety measures are
available to a business owner at little expense. See, e.g., Taco Bell, 744 P.2d. at

49 (lighting, video cameras, keeping a small amount of cash in the register, posting
a sign indicating minimum cash on hand, training employees how to react to
criminal situations). The costs of liability claims may include legal fees, insurance
deductibles for successful claims, as well as expenses or judgments beyond the

scope of the business owner's insurance policy.
85. See Comment, A Landowner's Duty to Guard Against Criminal Attack:
Foreseeability and the Prior Similar Incidents Rule, 48 Ono ST. L.J. 247, 264
(1987).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Decreased insurance costs could result in the long run due to the decrease
in crime resulting from increased safety measures caused by the imposition of
liability. The court in Taco Bell stated that the economic burden placed upon the
business owner may be offset by an increased number of customers due to the
increased security. Taco Bell, 744 P.2d at 49.
89. See Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 67
(Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting). Some courts and commentators
have suggested that such decisions which effect society to this degree should be
made by legislatures, not courts. See id. at 66-67 (Donnelly, J., and Welliver, J.,
dissenting); Warren v. Lombardo's Enter., Inc. 706 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986).
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One policy argument against the prior violent crimes exception is that
it may deter investments in new businesses within a state. If a business
were directly competing with businesses or markets in communities which
did not recognize the prior violent crimes exception, the foreign business
might enjoy a cost advantage. 0 Potential investors may choose to do business
or invest in businesses in jurisdictions where the cost of doing business
and potential liability is less. The economic effects of a prior crimes
exception reaches beyond the scope of burdening competition. Business
owners in high crime areas may be faced with the alternative of either
moving their business to a safer location or raising their prices to offset
the increased cost of doing business. 91 Unfortunately, areas of high crime
are typically inhabited by families in lower income brackets. Thus, not
only are business owners saddled with a financial burden, but this burden
is transferred through increased prices to consumers "who are less economically able to handle it." 92
The economic consequences of a broad reaching prior violent crimes
exception could have a substantial effect on the business sector. The
aggregate economic effect will likely be based upon the scope of duty, and
the severity of prior criminal incidents which the courts will require in
invoking the prior violent acts exception.
CONCLUSION
The imposition of liability upon business owners for third party criminal
attacks upon their premises is quickly becoming a well recognized and
viable theory of recovery. Although strong arguments support the acceptance
of this theory of tort liability, the specific parameters of liability are scarcely
defined. As the incidence of such actions brought against business owners
increases, business owners are left with no clear guidelines or predictability
by which to insure their protection against liability. The occurrence of
criminal conduct, as well as specific types of criminal acts, is inherently
unpredictable. Placing the decision of whether prior violent crimes are
sufficiently similar upon the trier of fact fails to provide business owners

with sufficient certainty in which to ascertain potential liability. In addition,
business owners are left in the dark as to what types of safety measures
will allow them to escape liability. Using the mere standard of "reasonable
foreseeability" as a guide for businesses in determining liability is
insufficient. Specific statutes or ordinances specifying safety measures for

90. States with major communities bordering neighboring states' communities
would likely be the most effected.
91. See Tipton, Business Insecurity; "Negligent Security" Suits Rise, St.
Louis Post Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1988, at 35BP.
92. Id.
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businesses is an alternative which would provide businesses with sufficient
guidelines, as well as potentially create a uniformly safer environment.
State legislatures should address and define these areas of ambiguity.
DAVID A. RoODMAN
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